Airline Regulatory Reform: A Legislative Analysis;Note by Greenman, Antonia M.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 11
1-1-1978
Airline Regulatory Reform: A Legislative
Analysis;Note
Antonia M. Greenman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greenman, Antonia M. (1978) "Airline Regulatory Reform: A Legislative Analysis;Note," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article
11.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol5/iss1/11
AIRLINE REGULATORY REFORM:
A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
Antonia M. Greenman*
INTRODUCTION
The Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977 (S. 689, the
Cannon-Kennedy bill), and its House counterpart, the Air Service Improvement
Act of 1977 (H.R. 8813, the Anderson-Johnson bill), are the most important
commercial aviation bills since the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1 The
far-reaching provisions of the Cannon-Kennedy and Anderson-Johnson bills will
have widespread ramifications.
Airlines have been regulated by the federal government since the Air
Commerce Act of 1926,2 which empowered the Secretary of Commerce to
regulate public air transportation. This act was revised in 1938, setting up the
Civil Aeronautics Authority to regulate routes and rates, and was further
amended by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The 1958 act redesignated the
authority as the Civil Aeronautics Board and gave it additional regulatory
authority.
Two federal agencies control all aspects of commercial aviation in the
United States: the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation
Administration. The FAA controls the requirements for and issuance of pilot
licenses, creates airport requirements and enforces safety regulations. The CAB
controls the lowering and raising of rates, the distribution of routes, issuance
of certificates for new services and airline expansion, and the allowance of
immunities from antitrust laws. Procedures regarding changes in rates, routes,
and certificates are often unwieldy and frequently lengthy. Airlines are often
unable to add new routes and services or change prices as rapidly as they
would wish, and sometimes totally prohibited from taking these actions. These
problems have caused Congress to consider various airline regulatory reforms.
Airline regulatory reform proposals have been under consideration by
Congress for the past three years.3 The Cannon-Kennedy bill is a product of
three years of deliberation and modification. It attempts to avoid the pitfalls
of its predecessor bills; however, it has apparently not entirely succeeded in
eliminating questions which have arisen in the minds of many influential and
legitimately concerned people. Nevertheless, the need for reform in this area
is urgent. For the past five years, the airline industry has only had a 3.6%
rate of return, lowest among 30 major industries.4 The industry's projected
*B.A., Niagara University, 1977; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1980.
1. 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §1301.
2. 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. §§1301, 1472, 1473, 1507-09.
3. 1975: S. 2551 and companion H.R. 10261 (Aviaton Act of 1975);
1976: S. 3364 (Air Transportation Act of 1976), S. 3536 (Federal Aviation Amendments of 1976);
1977: S. 689 (Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1977), S. 292 (Commercial Aviation
Regulatory Reform Act of 1977), H.R. 8813 (Air Service Improvement Act of 1977).
In addition, Rep. Elliott H. Levitas has introduced H.R. 9297 (National Air Transportation Act of
1978).
4. Letter from C.F. Eckel, director of regulatory affairs, United Airlines, Inc., to the author, Oct. 10,
1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation; testimony of Richard J. Ferris, president, United Airlines,
Inc., House Aviation Subcomm., Oct. 11, 1977 (United Airlines document at 4).
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capital needs for the coming 15 years is estimated at $60 billion for aircraft
and equipment. 5 It is evident that unless action is taken soon, the airline
industry will face irreparable difficulties.
As Senator Birch Bayh indicates, " . . .there is a serious need for an
overhaul of our regulatory system as it affects air travel in order to provide
increased competition in the airline industry."'6
Conservatives (Americans for Conservative Action), liberals (Americans for
Democratic Action), Civil Aeronautics Board members (including Chairman
Alfred E. Kahn), legislators, economists, executive branch officials, newspapers
(such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal), presidents of
both parties (former President Ford and President Carter), and airlines, generally
agree that reform is needed. 7 They disagree about to the extent and direction
of reform.8 Senators Howard Cannon and Edward M. Kennedy, and supporters
of the Cannon-Kennedy bill, argue that this bill represents the best approach
to solve the problems of airline regulation and protect the consumer inter-
est. 9 Opponents of the bill suggest that the Cannon-Kennedy proposals are too
drastic, and would create more problems than they would solve.' 0
This note reviews the provisions of the Cannon-Kennedy and Anderson-Johnson
bills, discusses their effects, and examines arguments for and against these
proposals.
THE PROPOSED REFORMS
The Cannon-Kennedy bill proposes reforms in the areas of rates, routes,
certificates, antitrust immunities, and subsidies, with the major emphasis on
rates, routes and certificates. 11 The Anderson-Johnson bill is similar in many
respects; significant differences will be noted.
Rates
The changes in the rate limitations involve determinants for rate increases
and decreases. Cannon-Kennedy permits 10% increases and decreases not
below direct cost (actual cost of making a flight) per year without CAB
approval. 12 Anderson-Johnson permits 10% increases and 25% decreases the
first year, and decreases of 50% thereafter, or 110% of direct cost. 13 The
Senate Commerce Committee has amended Cannon-Kennedy to allow 5%
increases and 35% decreases without CAB approval. 14 Changes in CAB's
procedure and prescriptive power would also be made by Cannon-Kennedy.
Rates changes under Section 21 of the bill would become effective after 60
days' notice to the CAB; the board would be forbidden from finding a rate
too low or too high if it falls under the above-mentioned percentages and
restrictions pertaining to costs. 15 Anderson-Johnson has no similar provision.
5. Id.
6. Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh to the author, Nov. 1, 1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation.
7. 123 Cong. Rec. S. 4620 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
8. 123 Cong. Rec. S. 4620 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
9. 123 Cong. Rec. S. 4620 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
10. "Carter Backs Reform Bill; Final Form Still in Doubt," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jun.
27, 1977 at 30.
11. S. 689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23 (1977).
12. S. 689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §21 (1977).
13. H.R. 8813, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §23 (1977).
14. Draft 3 of S. 689, Aug. 5, 1977, §18.
15. S. 689, supra note 11, §21.
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The airlines are divided over these rate provisions. United favors percentage
determinents similar to those of Cannon-Kennedy, although it opposes the
"direct cost" provisions, because they would involve problems such as difficulty
of computation, variances in definition of direct cost, and changes in determination
of direct cost simply by changing the type or schedule of aircraft in that
market, and necessitate increased CAB discretion. 16 Trans World Airlines
President C. E. Meyer, Jr., supports the "zone of reasonableness" concept. 17
American Airlines, although its former president, George Spater, had advocated
a "zone of reasonableness" for fares, is presently opposed to current rate
proposals. 18 Hughes Airwest believes that "fare flexibility within a reasonable'
zone" will work favorably toward smaller, "high productivity" airlines. 19 Delta's
senior vice president and general counsel, R. S. Maurer, supports "parameters
to be prescribed by Congress" through which the CAB would "grant airline
managements reasonable flexibility to adjust their standard prices," although
he believes the current provision of Cannon-Kennedy may be excessive. 20 The
Association of Local Transport Airlines favors the rate provisions, although it
would only apply them to markets having more than 1,000 passengers a
day.2 1
Most unions oppose the rate provisions. In testimony before the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee, representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), the Flight Engineers Association, and the Transit Workers Union
voiced concern that permitting "drastic" price cuts would result in job
losses.22 Members of these unions who work for Pan Am, however, as well as
Teamsters members who are Pan Am workers, support these provisions. 23 The
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC) takes an intermediate
position, supporting price flexibility while disagreeing with the "sweeping
reforms" of Cannon-Kennedy. 24
The unions have also voiced concerns that price cuts would cause reductions
in airline safety. The AFL-CIO Executive Council, in a February 25, 1977
statement, said that the then-current proposals would "encourage cost cutting
in such vital areas as safety . . . ". This has been disputed by James J.
Hartigan, vice-president of operations services of United, who argues there is
no correlation between airline profit and airline safety, 25 and FAA Chief
Administrator Langhorne Bond, who denies that regulatory reform of commercial
airlines could lead to reductions in FAA safety operations.26 In addition,
16. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, President, United Airlines, Inc., Senate Aviation Subcomm., Mar. 24,
1977 (United Airlines document at 21).
17. Testimony of C. E. Meyer, Jr., President, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Senate Aviation Subcomm.,
Mar. 14, 1977 (TWA document at 9).
18. "United Supports Reforms for More Flexible Pricing," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar.
21, 1977 at 197.
19. Memorandum of Russell V. Stephenson, General Manager, Hughes Airwest, Inc., May 5, 1977; see
123 Cong. Rec. S. 10414 (daily ed. Jun. 22, 1977).
20. Testimony of R. S. Maurer, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Delta Air Lines, Inc., Senate
Aviation Subcomm., Mar 24, 1977 (Delta Air Lines document at 3, 4).
21. Rosalind K. Ellingsworth, "Carriers Urge Cautious Reform Effort," Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, Apr. 4, 1977 at 26.
22. Rosalind K. Ellingsworth, "Carriers Urge Cautious Reform Effort," Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, Apr. 4, 1977 at 26.
23. 123 Cong. Rec. S. 13217 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1977) (Statement of Pan American World Airways
Employee "Awareness Committee").
24. Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, Airline Deregulation: A Recipe for Trouble at 8, n.d.
25. Testimony of James J. Hartigan, Vice President of Operations Services, United Airlines, Inc., House
Transportation Subcomm., Sept. 9, 1977 (United Airlines document Appendix D at 8).
26. "FAA Sees No Danger In Deregulation," Chicago Tribune, Nov. 30, 1977, §1 at 6, col. 1.
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new sections have been added to Cannon-Kennedy calling for an annual review
of safety regulations by the Secretary of Transportation, and a continuing
review of the fitness of all currently operating carriers.27
The Airline Passengers Association, composed of more than 40,000 members,
suggests that rate reform should be accompanied by a cut in the airline ticket
tax from 8% to 6%. Harold J. Salfen, APA's executive director, said, "A tax
of only four percent is now adequate to finance the Airport Development Aid
Program, leaving an ample two percent to provide funds for loans . . . to
meet the noise abatement regulations. 28
Routes
The changes in route regulation also involve both substantive and procedural
changes. Cannon-Kennedy permits automatic commencement of passenger
service by certified carriers and the three most experienced non-certified carriers
in markets currently authorized for nonstop routes which are not being serviced
by those authorized. (Carriers now provide nonstop service in only 16% of the
authorized markets.) 29 It also permits route additions each year. Extremely
large carriers are limited to one new route per year, of not more than 2,000
miles.30 Other CAB carriers and the three largest intrastate carriers are allowed
up to four new routes per year, totaling not more than 4,000 miles. 31
Anderson-Johnson has similar provisions. Cannon-Kennedy also amends the
meaning of "public convenience and necessity" under current law, 32 to
emphasize the importance of new air service, lower fares and better effic-
iency, while at the same time indicating that the tendency to create a monopoly
or excessive concentration is inconsistent with the public convenience and
necessity.33
Procedurally, Cannon-Kennedy speeds up other route cases, permitting
changes to become effective if the Board does not act within prescribed limits
of time.34 Anderson-Johnson sets a limit of one year for the CAB to decide
any case. 35 Cannon-Kennedy also places the burden of proof on the opposing
party for demonstrating a route is against the public convenience and necessity,
and limits such proof to strict evidentiary standards; if entry is denied, it
allows the reviewing court to apply its expert judgment as to whether these
standards have been adhered to.36 Anderson-Johnson has similar provisions.3 7
Route provisions of Cannon-Kennedy have been substantially amended by
the Senate Commerce Committee. 38 Although the basic automatic entry provisions
have been left substantially intact, 39 permitting instead one new route per year
for the two years after the legislation is enaicted, and two routes in each of
the following three years, not to exceed 3,000 miles in total, "protective
27. Draft 3 of S. 689, supra note 14, §§4 and 16.
28. Airline Passengers Association news release, Aug. 15, 1977 at 1.
29. Testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 7 at S. 4622.
30. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
31. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
32. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §401(d), 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §1301. "Public convenience and
necessity" under this law involved the useful purpose of the new service balanced against the adequacy
of existing routes or carriers and the possible "impairment" of the operations of existing carriers.
33. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
34. S. 689, supra note 11, §8.
35. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §25.
36. S. 689, supra note 11, §23.
37. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §4.
38. "Air Competition Widened in Vote by Senate Panel," The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30, 1977 at 4,
col. I.
39. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
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measures" have been added which change the effectiveness of the above-mentioned
provisions. Each carrier, under the amended bill, could designate "immune
routes" each year which would be protected. Regarding the prohibition of
expansion, three routes could be designated during the first three years after
enactment, two routes the fourth year, and one route the fifth. Regarding the
permitting of competition, smaller local service or intrastate carriers could
open competition to others on only two of their routes per year. Larger
trunklines could open three routes to competition in the first year and four
in the second. The largest trunkline carriers (American, Delta, Eastern Airlines,
Trans World Airlines, and United Airlines) would be required to open all
routes to competition, except those set aside under the expansion provision.4°
The airlines have generally opposed all provisions for freer entry. The
president of American Airlines, Albert V. Casey, has said that increased
numbers of carriers on routes will produce decreased load factors (percentages
of seating capacity actually sold and used) and thereby drive up prices, 41 and
that airlines will drop out of markets, because more and more markets would
become unprofitable, -for one airline, while another would gain profit, thus
lessening both service and competition.42 In contrast, United Airlines supports
an automatic route expansion program for existing carriers, with limitations
on the number of routes which could be added by new carriers.43 TWA also
supports the limited automatic entry provisions: L. Edwin Smart, TWA's
chairman, stated that permitting airlines to add one route per year, while
setting aside a given number of markets ineligible for entry in a given year,
is "a good and properly cautious approach to the orderly expansion of the
competitive environment in our industry."'44
Braniff Airlines' position is typical of the smaller airlines; it believes these
provisions would only increase dominance by the extremely large carriers,
forcing small carriers to merge, and reducing competition. 45 Delta Airlines'
vice president for law and regulatory affairs, James W. Callison, has stated
the automatic entry provisions are "deregulation of the wrong kind" and "a
major cause of our strong opposition to the Senate bill." He said it complicated
the bill, noting because it has necessitated countervailing protections in the
interest of small carriers and small communities. He added,
, * I these 'protections,' in turn, have transformed the Senate bill into a
100-page complex morass of proposals for more, not less regulation, and more,
not less subsidy. The Senate bill has now gone full cycle from the early
days of the reform debate-in many respects it is not a deregulation proposal
at all, but one for increased bureaucracy and more governmental inter-
ference . . . 46
40. "Air Competition Widened in Vote by Senate Panel," The Wall Street Journal, supra note 38.
41. Testimony of Albert V. Casey, President, American Airlines, Inc., House Aviation Subcomm., Oct. 5,
1977 (American Airlines document at 2).
42. Albert V. Casey, "A Statement on Airline Regulation," The New York Times, Nov. 8, 1976, at 31
(Op Ed page).
43. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 16 at 24-25.
44. Testimony of L. Edwin Smart, Chairman, Trans World Airlines, Inc., House Aviation Subcomm., Oct.
12, 1977 (TWA document at 5).
45. Rush Loving, Jr., "The Pros and Cons of Airline Deregulation," Fortune, Aug. 1977 at 211.
46. Letter from James W. Callison, Vice President of Law and Regulatory Affairs, Delta Air Lines, Inc.
to the author, Oct. 6, 1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation; see also testimony of James W.
Callison, House Aviation Subcomm., Oct. 11, 1977 (Delta Airlines document at 9).
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The Airline Passengers Association, which generally supports the regulatory
reform bill, expressed a different concern about automatic entry. Harold J.
Salfen, the association's executive secretary, asserts that
a serious disservice would be rendered to the air traveler if we should create
a situation in which 15 or 20 different carriers were willing to fly him to his
destination, but could not because of an insufficient fuel supply . . . A serious
energy problem could develop. 47
On the other hand, United's president, Richard J. Ferris, argues that the
airlines have been leaders in fuel conservation, citing as an example that in
1976, U.S. carriers transported 7.4 million passengers more than in 1972, while
using 8.5% less fuel. 48
The liberalized routes provisions have been supported by both Charles L.
Schultze, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and CAB
Chairman Kahn. Dr. Schultze stated in testimony before the Senate Aviation
Subcommittee that automatic entry should be phased in with pricing flexibility
"sufficient to constitute a meaningful threat" 49 of competition. Chairman Kahn
has stated in correspondence to several senators that " . . . I do not fear
disasterous consequences from automatic entry, and am anxious to see decisive
movement toward more competition. ' 50
Certification and Market Entry
The certification provisions of Cannon-Kennedy, while they have not received
as much publicity as the rate and route provisions, are nonetheless important
because they produce a substantial shift in direction. The Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 only permitted issuance if it was required by the "public convenience
and necessity."' 51 Cannon-Kennedy requires certificates to be issued by the
CAB for scheduled, charter, or overseas passenger carriers, unless found to be
inconsistent with "public convenience and necessity."' 52 Noncharter air carriers,
however, are limited in the number of charter trips they may perform. All-cargo
airlines meeting ordinary standards of fitness, willingness, and ability must be
issued certificates after January 1, 1979, regardless of whether it is inconsistent
with the "public convenience and necessity." 53 Commuter airlines utilizing
planes of under 56 passenger seats or 18,000 pounds payload would be exempt
from certification by the CAB.54 The Anderson-Johnson bill provides the same
limits. 55
In addition, if a carrier does not utilize its authority for nonstop service,
the certificate for that service shall be given to another carrier. 56 Anderson-Johnson
has an identical provision. 57 A carrier will be permitted to terminate service
required by its certificate upon 30 days notice to the CAB; however, the CAB
47. Airlines Passengers Association news release, supra note 28.
48. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 4 at 24.
49. Testimony of Charles L. Schultze, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, before the Senate Aviation
Subcomm., Mar. 22, 1977; see testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 16 at 21.
50. Letter from Alfred Kahn to Sen. Harrison Schmidt, Sept. 12, 1977; see testimony of Richard J.
Ferris, supra note 16, Appendix B at 1.
51. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 32.
52. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
53. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
54. S. 689, supra note 11, §19.
55. H.R.8813, supra note 13, §18.
56. S. 689, supra note 11, §9.
57. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §6.
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may suspend this termination. 58 Also, the authority of the President of the
United States to approve or disapprove the issuance, transfer, suspension,
revocation, or modification of any certificate is eliminated by the repeal of
Section 801 of the 1958 Act.59 The chairman of Pan Am, William T. Seawell,
has strongly opposed this elimination, on the grounds that it would have an
adverse effect upon agreements for international air traffic. He states that the
repeal of Presidential authority "in foreign and overseas air transportation,
foreign air carrier permits, and international fares and rates . . . [would] be
a serious mistake."' 60 He also cites a Supreme Court ruling which states the
necessity of Presidential intervention in air transportation, and a U.S. Court
of Appeals ruling from the Second Circuit which expressly recognizes Presidential
power with respect to international air transportation. 61
A proposal in Anderson-Johnson which is also in the Senate bill involves
"domestic fill-up rights." This provision permits airlines who are carrying
passengers between cities on international flights (e.g., Los Angeles-New
York-London) to carry local, i.e., U.S., passengers. A carrier would be permitted
to obtain this right for three routes in the first year and two routes per year
in subsequent years.62 This proposal has the strong support of carriers such
as Pan Am and TWA.63
The airlines have generally opposed easier certification. Frank Borman,
president of Eastern Air Lines, contends that it will not aid competition at
all. "Who is going to enter the airline industry today? . . . It just can't be
done," he argues.64 Richard J. Ferris counters that airlines which are against
liberalized certification measures want to restrict competition." They don't
want any new airlines to be let into the club," he said.65 Nevertheless, United
believes that the current provisions regarding "PC&N" should be retained,
and that hearings should be held to determine fitness, willingness, and ability
of new carriers, as well as their "PC&N". 66 TWA has a similar view; Chairman
L. Edwin Smart has stated that changing the "PC&N" doctrine as proposed
by Anderson-Johnson would "open [the doors] so wide that the plans for the
automatic entry door become meaningless. ' 67
Commuter and local carriers have supported most of the new certification
provisions, particularly the CAB's right to revoke certificates authorizing nonstop
service which are not being exercised, and to reissue the certificates to other
"fit, willing, and able carriers." As Frank Lorenzo, chairman of the Association
of Transport Airlines, stated, "We believe that it is only fair that carriers
holding route authority that others could operate profitably either use it or
lose it . . . "68 TWA strongly opposes this section, pointing out that carriers
often have nonstop authority between points which have not developed sufficient
58. S. 689, supra note 11, §14.
59. S. 689, supra note 11, §20.
60. Testimony of William T. Seawell, Chairman, Pan American World Airways, Inc., Senate Aviation
Subcomm., Mar. 24, 1977 (Pan Am document at 7).
61. United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S..304 (1936); Pan American v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir.
1941).
62. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §7.
63. Testimony of William T. Seawell, supra note 60 at 7.
64. Interview of Frank Borman, President, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1977, §6 at
12, cols. 4-5.
65. Interview of Richard J. Ferris, President, United Airlines, Inc., Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1977, §6 at
12 col. 2.
66. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 16, at 25.
67. Testimony of L. Edwin Smart, supra note 44, at 8.
68. Frank Lorenzo, "Reform with Caution," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar. 28, 1977 at 9.
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traffic for nonstop service. Carriers which attempt to provide these points with
multi- or one-stop service until market growth is sufficient would thus be
deprived of the right to do SO. 69
Unions, including the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, have
expressed concern over the erosion of the "PC&N" doctrine. BRAC believes
it will cause "excessive, wasteful competition in major air travel markets"
while causing problems' with service to "forgotten city-pairs" (i.e., less profitable
markets). 70
Antitrust ProvisionsOther sections of Cannon-Kennedy provide for the elimination of antitrust
immunities, and for establishment of subsidies. The airlines have traditionally
been permitted to make agreements with each other which would otherwise
be considered violations of antitrust laws. This was originally permitted because
the airlines were considered a "fledgling industry," needing such "protection;"
although this need no longer exists, the protections have been continued. As
a result, airlines have made agreements to limit capacity, to not compete for
certain routes, to cut back on routes, and even to not transport certain categories
of passengers. 71 Although some agreements, such as standardized passenger
and baggage agreements, have been beneficial to the consumer, the majority
of these transactions have been in restraint of trade.
The antitrust immunity provisions of the Cannon-Kennedy bill eliminate
CAB mandatory jurisdiction over consolidation, merger, or acquisition of control,
arrangements to cut back the number of flights, and any similar agreements.
A procedure is set up whereby the Attorney General would review all agreements
and actions in this area. If the Attorney General finds an antitrust violation,
he is to notify the CAB and the parties involved; this suspends the transaction.
The Attorney General is permitted, however, to exempt agreements which do
not restrain competition or effect the control of a carrier directly engaged in
the operation of aircraft in air transportation. 72 The CAB also retains the
right to make exemptions in the public interest (such as standardized baggage
and ticket exchange pacts). 73 No similar provisions are included in
Anderson-Johnson. Many of the airlines are hesitant about altering the present
system of antitrust immunities. Some, such as United, are concerned that it
may prohibit cooperative agreements which benefit the public. 74 United's
Richard J. Ferris stated that it will "subject the carriers to unnecessary and
very costly legal harassment." He pointed out that if the CAB were allowed
to retain jurisdiction over these agreements, this would "not only preserve this
network and its associated public benefits, but would allow new entrants, if
they chose, to compete as participants in that network. ' 75 Other airlines, such
as TWA and American, oppose any changes in this area. Albert V. Casey,
president and chairman of American Airlines, has argued that limitations on
passenger capacity should not only be allowed, but mandated by the CAB. 76
Smaller airlines, such as Braniff, vehemently disagree with this assessment.
69. Testimony of L. Edwin Smart, supra note 44 at 9.
70. Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, supra note 24. at 5-6.
71. Testimony of Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 7, at S. 4623
72. S. 689, supra note 11, §18.
73. S. 689, supra note 11, §19.
74. Cannon-Kennedy has specifically provided for this by allowing the CAB to permit agreements (between
air carriers) which are in the public interest.
75. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris supra note 16, at 16.
76. Loving, Jr., supra note 45, at 212.
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Braniff's chairman, Harding Lawrence, has stated, "you are destroying the
free enterprise system when you put capacity limitations on it. I find it
repugnant!" 77
Support Our Service (SOS), an employees' association largely composed
of Western Airlines personnel, has argued that the entire system of "interlining,"
i.e., transfer of passengers, baggage or cargo from one airline to another during
one trip for a single ticket transaction, would "come under a cloud" as a
result of this provision. They believe that "literally thousands of interline
agreements [would need to] be reviewed and revised."' 78 Allegheny's president,
Edwin I. Colodny, asserts that other legitimate agreements would be affected
as well. He gives as an example .his company's agreements with 12 commuter
carriers that link 37 small cities with Allegheny routes, in return for services
and facilities given to them by Allegheny. Since the agreements involve capacity,
equipment, schedules, and fares, they might be vulnerable to antitrust dismantling
under the new provisions. 79
Subsidies
Cannon-Kennedy provides for a federal subsidy program which attempts
to insure adequate air service to communities which require but are unable
to obtain service from a natonal air carrier. The bill is not specific as to how
such a program would operate. Senator Kennedy has set forth his views as
to how such a program would work.80 The government would subsidize particular
air service, not particular airlines. Small communities presently receiving service
would be included in this program. All qualified airlines would be eligible to
provide the required service and thus receive the subsidy. Passengers traveling
to and from small towns on subsidized flights would be given the advantages
of interlining, joint fares and other similar conveniences, regardless of whether
the service was provided by a certificated or a noncertificated carrier. Aircraft
loan guarantees would also be extended to noncertificated carriers who otherwise
qualify. Anderson-Johnson contains provisions to subsidize small community
service, preserve passenger advantages, and provide aircraft loans.8' It also
includes a provision guaranteeing service for the next ten years to any city
presently receiving CAB certificated air service; if the certificated carrier
terminates this service, the CAB is required to subsidize a commuter replacement
for ten years.8 2
The Senate Commerce Committee has reduced the subsidy provisions of
Cannon-Kennedy. The committee's bill would permit airlines to drop unprofitable
flights, while subsidizing commuter carriers to offer this service and assuring
small cities of some service for ten years.8 3
Not surprisingly, the commuter airlines strongly favor this proposal. The
president of the Commuter Airline Association of America, Thomas S. Miles,
said, "We agree with the provisions of the draft covering the small community
service program [and] federal subsidy .. . "84
77. Loving, Jr., supra note 45, at 212.
78. SOS (Support Our Service) pamphlet; see Cong. Rec. (daily ed.), Apr. 28, 1977 at S. 6635.
79. Testimony of Edwin I. Colodny, President, Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Senate Aviation Subcomm., Mar.
29, 1977 (Allegheny Airlines document at 11-15).
80. Testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 7, at S. 4624.
81. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §19.
82. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, §19.
83. "Air Competition Widened in Vote by Senate," The Wall Street Journal, supra note 38.
84. "Carter Backs Reform Bill," Aviation Week and Space Technology, supra note 10.
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Sam I. Aldock, president of Systems Analysis and Research Corporation,
sees serious problems arising from this measure. Drawing on his 18 years of
experience with the CAB (prior to founding SARC), he points out that this
program will increase regulation of this sector, not lessen it.85 He also says
that deterioration of this service is probable under these provisions, since the
fixed term guarantee of service is really no guarantee at all, and could
eventually permit service to be phased out completely.8 6 American's Albert
Casey posits a unique contention: that by proposing this subsidy pro-
gram, deregulators are "arguing, in effect, that federal planning is superior to
market forces as a means of deciding who shall and who shall not receive
service." 87
The local transport airlines are also in opposition. ALTA88 contends that
turning over their operations to commuter airlines would downgrade service,
in some cases from jet to air taxi, or even eliminate it. They believe that
cities currently served by "local" airlines should retain the right to that service,
with government subsidy, if necessary, to those carriers.89
Allegheny has seen another flaw in the subsidy measure. Its president,
Edwin I. Colodny, in his testimony before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee,
pointed out that service to small communities will only be seen as essential
in light of "degree of isolation" and "availability of alternative means of
transportation." This could conceivably result in severe limitations on what
communities would receive subsidy, and therefore -service.90 United has stated,
however, that it "can accept the idea of government financial support for
carriers who are required to continue air service to unprofitable communities
where the services are deemed essential." 91
Additionally, some senators from predominately rural states, or states with
a widely dispersed population, have seen this bill as a backward step. Senator
George McGovern, in a statement to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, expressed fears that commuter airlines would be
financially unstable even with subsidies, and provide *insufficient service for
states which depended greatly on air transportation for both intra- and interstate
travel, such as South Dakota. (There is no Amtrak in South Dakota.) 92 Senator
Theodore Stevens of Alaska has said that he agrees "with the goals of the
small community service provisions," but he is "not sure if the bill is how to
get there."'93 He would be willing, to support the bill, but only after modifications
85. "Airline Deregulation Fallacies," letter from Sam I. Aldock, President, Systems Analysis and Research
Corporation, August, 1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation
86. Sam I. Aldock, "U. S. Airlines and The Free Market System," Air Transport World, July, 1977 at
52-53.
87. "Casey Tells Senate Panel Deregulation Would Destroy World's Finest Air Network," Flagship News
(American Airlines newspaper), Apr. 18, 1977 at I col. 1.
88. ALTA, the Association of Local Transport Airlines, is composed of: Air New England, Air Midwest,
Alaska Airlines (which has broken with ALTA's position on entry), Allegheny Airlines, Aloha Airlines,
Frontier Airlines (which has also broken with ALTA's position on entry), Hawaiian Airlines, Hughes
Airwest (which has broken with ALTA's position on the entire regulatory reform issue), North Central
Airlines, Ozark Airlines, Piedmont Airlines, Reeve Aleutian Airways, Southern Airways, Texas
International Airlines, Wien Air Alaska.
89. Association of Local Transport Airlines, Position on Legislative Proposals for Regulatory Reform,
Apr. 1977.
90. Allegheny Airlines, Why the Revised Cannon-Kennedy Bill Sould Not Be Enacted at 4.
91. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 4, at 27.
92. Testimony of Sen. George McGovern, Senate Commerce Comm.; see 123 Cong. Rec. S. 5093 (daily
ed. Mar. 29, 1977).
93. "Carter Backs Reform Bill," Aviation Week and Space Technology, supra note 10.
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are made which would assure him that the bill will not harm air transportation
in Alaska, because of Alaska's almost total dependence on air transporta-
tion.94
These concerns by senators about the effects of the bills' subsidy provisions
are by no means insignificant. Even Senator Bayh of Indiana, who has voiced
concern about the CAB's having "consistently opposed attempts to reduce air
fares", and who favors regulatory reform, says that he has "some reservations
about the effect of legislation of this nature on small communities". 95
CAB Procedures
Cannon-Kennedy also changes basic CAB hearing and decision making
procedures. The need for CAB approval of rates (within the set percentages)
is eliminated. A time limit is set, within which the CAB must decide any
route case; if the board does not act within the prescribed time, the route is
automatically awarded. The bill also shifts the burden of proof in route cases
to the party in opposition to the granting of the route: that party must
demonstrate that the route is against the public convenience and necessity.
The board is required to adhere to strict evidentiary standards and allows a
reviewing court to apply its expert judgment as to whether these standards
have been adherd to.96 The procedure regarding antitrust matters is altered to
eliminate CAB jurisdiction, except for the power to allow immunities in the
public interest, and grants that jurisdiction to the Attorney General. It is his
duty, under this bill, to inform the parties involved if there is a violation of
antitrust law, and upon his reporting it to them and to the CAB, the transaction
is suspended.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS
The effects on free competition, on consumers, on employees, on communities,
and on the airlines themselves, must be considered. Conceivably, at worst,
competition in some areas would be scarcely opened, some consumers might
be forced to pay higher prices, some employees might lose jobs, some communities
might lose certain services, and some airlines might sink deeper "in the red."
On the other hand, free competition in many areas could be opened, many
consumers could benefit from substantial savings on fares, many new jobs
could be created through expansions and additional carriers and services, many
communities could receive new service or be guaranteed present service, and
many carriers could finally be "in the black" or expand.
All of these fears and hopes concerning the effects of Cannon-Kennedy
have been raised by different groups, interests, and individuals. Examining the
effects of this legislation on these groups may allow us better to forecast its
effects.
Competition
Proponents of Cannon-Kennedy assert that it will increase competition
among the airlines through less regulation of rates, routes, and certificates.
Flexibility in pricing allows carriers to set competitive rates in the various
markets according to direct costs and demands. Automatic addition of routes
94. "Carter Backs Reform Bill," Aviation Week and Space Technology, supra note 10.
95. Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh to the author, Nov. 1, 1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation.
96. S. 689, supra note 11, §23.
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facilitates expansion of services. Freer certification provisions permit newer or
smaller airlines to enter different markets, and medium-sized carriers to expand.
If these provisions stood by themselves, there would be a strong possibility
of their working both ways. Free price regulation by itself is no guarantee of
competition: one airline could price another completely out of the market
(especially if it were larger than its former competitor); automatic route
addition by itself is no assurance of growth for smaller carriers: a major airline
could take over even more routes; easier certification by itself gives no certainty
that more certificated carriers would result: existing carriers could expand that
much more easily.
The Cannon-Kennedy bill, however, has safeguards which would assure
that this would not happen. The percentage limits remain on fares and the
CAB retains power to find rates outside these limits unjust or unreasonable;
the smaller carriers are allowed to add more routes per year than are larger
carriers or extremely large trunklines and to protect some routes from competition;
the CAB retains some control over the certification process through the assertion
of incompatibility with the public convenience and necessity.
Consumers
Consumers are directly affected by the rate and route provisions. Obviously,
price cuts will "give the consumer a break" and route expansion will provide
greater areas of service. The chance that rates will be increased is also existant,
as is the possibility that three or four (perhaps fewer) airlines will dominate
the industry, thus limiting (or eliminating) choices for the consumer.
In regard to rates, however, the Cannon-Kennedy bill has been amended
to permit only rate increases of 5% while allowing cuts of 35%. This tilts the
advantage in the consumer's favor. As for routes, the limitations on additions,
especially the one-per-year limit on extremely large carriers should obviate the
possibility of domination by them. The fact that all routes of large carriers
(with a very few minor exceptions) will be open to competition from all other
carriers will further prevent this from occurring.
Airline Employees
Airline employees have serious concerns about these reforms. Price cuts
could easily be obtained through job eliminations; route cutbacks of "red-ink
runs" could cause reductions in positions; extemely strong competition causing
loss of routes could have the same result. To the exployees, the possibility of
other jobs through expansions (although very likely) seems too tentative.
In its February 25, 1977 statement, the AFL-CIO Executive Council
asserted that current legislation "would adversely affect the stability of air
transport industry and the job security of over 300,000 airline employees.
In response to these concerns, the Senate Commerce Committee has amended
Cannon-Kennedy to protect airline workers from job losses due to freer
competition 97 and Anderson-Johnson has similar provisions. 98 Nevertheless,
United's president, Richard J. Ferris, has astutely recognized problems which
could occur with this provision, such as unnecessary government intervention
and cause/effect problems of how to distinguish general business circumstance
job losses from those possibly resulting from reforms. 99
97. "Air Competition Widened in Vote by Senate Panel," The Wall Street Journal, supra note 40.
98. H.R. 8813, supra note 13, § 27.
99. Testimony of Richard J. Ferris, supra note 4, at 38.
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Small Communities
Small communities appear to obtain some advantages from Cannon-Kennedy
in the subsidy, certificate, and route provisions. Subsidies to commuter airlines
and others serving small towns would, in theory, assure service for the next
ten years. The changes in the certification procedures, including the redefinition
of the "public convenience and necessity" formula, the transfer of the burden
of proof to opponents of certificates, and the elimination of hearings in routine
cases would facilitate certification of the small, presently uncertified carriers
serving communities, by facilitating certification. Automatic route additions
would allow larger carriers to provide service to some small communities.
Nevertheless, there are still problems in this area. Ten-year guarantees of
subsidies would inssure service only to those presently served by certificated
carriers. The mere facilitating of certification might increase the number of
certificated carriers; it is important to remember, however, that the ten-year
provision only applies to communities now receiving certificated-carrier service.
Also, airlines will not necessarily add routes to smaller communities because
such routes are not always profitable; in fact, under the new provisions airlines
could more easily drop unprofitable flights to small communities. The subsidy
provision would not cover a situation if there were no "fit, willing, or able"
commuter airline to take over the dropped route.
Although this problem has not been given extensive attention, it is a severe
one: in the last 15 years, 170 cities have lost certificated air service, and less
than 100 of these have been taken over by the commuter airlines.100 Perhaps
the better solution is to permit airlines to drop "unprofitable" flights only if
there is another "fit, willing, and able" carrier. If there is not a replacement
carrier, the airline could receive a government subsidy in order to continue
the service.
The Airlines
The airlines have voiced concerns that lower fares would lead to less
frequent and less reliable service. Corner-cutting, marginal profits, and the
weakening of the economic base of the air transportation industry caused by
automatic entry would lead to dominance by one or two airlines. Mergers
would become necessary_ to "stay in the running" with expanded large carriers
but would be restricted by the provisions on antitrust immunities. These are
valid concerns; even though some emotionalism has been generated regarding
regulatory reform, at the bottom of it all lie deep concerns for what sort of
future the airline industry will have. The future of this industry depends on
the respective success of several different types of carriers. Their concerns
about Cannon-Kennedy are disparate.
Concentration of business among a few large carries is a concern of
comparatively small carriers. Nevertheless, smaller, aggressive, lower-priced
airlines can make inroads into the widespread systems of extremely large
carriers and thereby move into more lucrative markets, while the extremely
large carriers would be forced to juggle their resources, responding more slowly
to competition from many carriers over numerous routes. At the same time,
smaller carriers would be protected from having to "fight for" routes they
already served, because only two of their routes per year would be open to
competition.
100. Testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 7, at S. 4623.
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Many carriers have reacted unfavorably to the price provisions. Permitting
35% price cuts while allowing only 5% price increases has seemed unbalanced
to some carriers' who would have preferred the allowance of 10% increases
or decreases or some similar "equal" figures. This would not, however, facilitate
competition as much as the allowance of deeper price cuts. It might even
reduce the competive factor; if an airline raises rates 10% on a number of
routes and lowers them 10% on an equivalent amount, outside competing forces
would not have much effect. The chances of this happening under the 5%/35%
system are much less, because a 5% cut balanced with a 5% increase probably
would not prove sufficiently worthwhile, especially in terms of attracting
passengers.
The elimination of most antitrust immunities would benefit the smaller
carriers. Elimination of "agreements to cut back" and similar arrangements
would greatly lessen the encroachment of larger carriers upon smaller carriers'
markets. Some of the extremely large carriers have been apprehensive regarding
how the antitrust provisions would affect agreements they have made or intend
to make which they consider proper or in the public interest. It must be
remembered that if an agreement is in the public interest, it will be upheld
by the CAB, regardless of the Attorney General's interpretations.
Prospects for Enactment
The Cannon-Kennedy bill was introduced by Senators Cannon and Kennedy,
along with co-sponsors Senators James Abourezk, Frank Church, and James
Allen, on February 10, 1977, and referred to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Hearings were held in late March,
1977. The bill was amended, voted upon by the committee, and ordered
reported on October 27, 1977.
The Anderson-Johnson bill was introduced by Representatives Glenn
Anderson and Harold Johnson, along with co-sponsors Representatives Teno
Roncalio, Allen Ertel, Norman Mineta, and John Fary, on August 5, 1977,
and referred to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
Hearings were held at the beginning of October, 1977.
The Senate and House will vote on both of these bills in 1978, and some
form of airline deregulation legislation is expected to be enacted. The Senate
will clearly pass some variation of Cannon-Kennedy within the next few months,
and prospects are very strong for passage of comparable legislation in the
House before the close of the 95th Congress. The greatest likelihood is that
a slightly amended version of Cannon-Kennedy will form the basis for legislation
in both the Senate and House. In view of strong support for regulatory reform
within both the executive branch and Congress, it is considerably more likely
than not that the Senate/House Conference Committee will be able to reconcile
differing versions of the bill passed by each house of Congress, and that airline
regulatory reform will be enacted into law before the end of 1978.
CONCLUSION
The Cannon-Kennedy bill will provide extensive reform of the airline
industry. As Senator Bayh points out, "It is my feeling that legislation in this
area should be enacted." 101 The major portions of the bill composed of
101. Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh to the author, Nov. 1, 1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation.
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permissible percentages for rate increases and decreases, automatic route
additions and easier certification for new services and carriers, would eliminate
much of the restrictiveness and delay of the present system. Other provisions
of the bill deal with different aspects of the same problem. The elimination
of antitrust immunities will increase competition; the providing of subsidies
for less profitable routes will facilitate small-town service; the procedural
reforms will make decision-making more efficient.
Although it is probable that some form of airline deregulation will be
enacted in 1978, some doubt and opposition lingers with regard to the
Cannon-Kennedy and Anderson-Johnson bills. "Airline deregulation" (more
accurately, regulatory reform) has a startling connotation to it, which has
caused unnecessary anxieties. It does not mean that all limitations on rates,
routes, or certificates will be eliminated. Cannon-Kennedy has built-in safeguards
and retains certain necessary restrictions in each of these, as has been previously
discussed. It does not mean that safety standards will be lowered; the bill does
not effect Federal Aviation Administration rules, and it is a non sequitur that
price cuts mean less safety.
Cannon-Kennedy does mean that flexibility in rates will be facilitated, that
financial assistance will aid airlines in providing small community service, that
new carriers will be able to enter the airline industry more easily, and that
existing carriers will more easily be able to engage in new types of service.
The need for airline regulatory reform has perhaps been most succinctly
stated by C. F. Eckel, director of regulatory affairs of United Airlines:
Our basic premise is that the men and women who manage the nation's
airlines are more able to determine routes, service, and prices for their customers
than is a government agency. Management should be tested by the market
place, not by formulas or analysis by clerks. Most American businesses operate
without government control of what they sell, where they sell and what they
charge. We think airlines should have the same freedom.10 2
As Rush Loving, Jr., stated in his Fortune article, "The deregulators are
clearly correct in believing the time is ripe for reform."1 03 President Carter
favors airline regulatory reform, and this support for, deregulation by the
President is consistent with his goals for executive branch reorganization. 10 4 The
chairman of the relevant regulatory agency, CAB Chairman Alfred E. Kahn,
has been a strong proponent of reform of the CAB's regulatory procedures
and of the relationship between government and the nation's airlines.
With the President and the relevant executive branch administrators favoring
airline regulatory reform, and momentum in Congress supporting the changes
set forth in the Cannon-Kennedy and Anderson-Johnson bills, it is clear that
the authority and jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board over the nation's
airlines, and the competition between and among the airlines, will be substantially
different by the close of the 95th Congress.
102. Letter from C. F. Eckel, director of regulatory affairs, United Airlines, Inc., to the author, Oct. 10,
1977, on file at the Journal of Legislation.
103. Loving, Jr., supra note 45.
104. Reorganization Act of 1977: The President's Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, 13 Weekly Comp.
of Pres. Doc. 493 (Apr. 6, 1977).
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